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RECENT CASEs

precedent. The court reviewed the merits of the habeas corpus
petition and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the petition. The
court reviewed the merits of the petition in order to eliminate the
circuity of action that would have occurred had the court simply held
that the petitioner's exclusive remedy was under RCr 11.42. Had the
court so held, the petitioner's sole recourse would then have been to
resort to RCr 11.42 to present the same question which was then
before the court. Since the grounds set forth in the petition were not
sufficient to justify relief from the judgment by habeas corpus or under
RCr 11.42, the court, under the authority of Hobbs, considered the
merits of the petition and affirmed the dismissal on that basis.
Kentucky has taken two important steps forward in 1964 in the
area of post conviction remedy. The first was the holding in Ayers
that RCr 11.42 is exclusive in the absence of a showing that it is
inadequate. The second was the holding in Langdon, which qualified
the Ayers decision by incorporating the Hobbs decision within its
scope. The Kentucky rule, in light of these decisions, is that where
the validity of a petitioner's imprisonment can be tested by a motion
to vacate judgment, filed pursuant to RCr 11.42, such procedure is
exclusive. However, if the allegation in the petition for habeas corpus
is taken as true, and such allegation does not render the original
judgment void, the court wvill not only affirm the necessity of proceeding pursuant to RCr 11.42, but will also negatively dispose of the
merits of the allegation just as if it had arisen on appeal from a denial
of a motion to vacate judgment.
Ralph R. Kinney

BELow COST-EVIDENCE OF INTENT.-Plaintiff
laundry brought an action against defendant laundry for alleged
violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 865.030(1) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
Defendant's salesmen, in efforts to expand the firm's linen rental
service among motels and nursing homes, solicited some of plaintiff's
regular customers by offering two weeks' free service. Plaintiff does
ordinary laundry and dry cleaning only. Two of the customers
switched to defendant, thus causing plaintiff to lose accounts totaling
some 160 dollars per week. Defendant admitted giving the free
service and, strictly as a conciliatory gesture, promised to cease this
practice. The trial court, on the basis of pre-trial depositions, opening
statements of counsel, and the testimony of plaintiff's president,
entered a summary judgment for defendant after agreement that no
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additional facts would have been brought forward at trial. The trial
court felt there was not sufficient evidence that defendant had intended to injure competitors and destroy competition, as required by
KRS 365.080(1). Held: Proof that defendant laundry intended to
gain business from its competitor was proof of intent to injure the
plaintiff competitor under the terms of the statute. Laundry Operating
Co. v. Spalding Laundry-Dry Cleaning Co., 383 S.W.2d 364 (Ky.
1964).
KRS 365.030(1) reads as follows:
Except as provided in KRS 365.040, no person engaged in business
within this state shall sell, offer for sale, or advertise for sale any article
or product, or service or output of a service trade, at less than the cost
thereof to such vendor, or give, offer to give or advertise the intent to
give away any article or product, or service or output of a service trade,
for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition.

Most of the states which have enacted "sale-below-cost" statutes
require two elements for a violation: a sale below cost and an intent
to injure competition or competitors.' In nine states, a sale below
cost alone raises a presumption of the requisite intent, while four
states require, in addition, some showing of the effect on competition.2
However, no provision for such a presumption is to be found in the
Kentucky act.
The wording of the Kentucky act is in the conjunctive, but the
court in the principal case dispenses with any argument that an
intent to injure competitors and destroy competition are two distinct
elements, each of which is necessary to establish a violation. "Considering the nature and policy of the statute ...
the court concludes
that the phrase "injuring competitors and destroying competition"
describes one single activity, "a reduction of competition at the expense
of a competitor."3
The decision seems a clear departure from earlier interpretations
of KRS 865.030(1) as to the way in which the necessary intent is to be
established. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Carlisle Ice Co.4 involved a contract under which defendant ice company was selling its product
below cost. The defendant's refusal to renew the contract after the
effective date of the statute was held to be evidence that defendant
was without intent to harm competition. The court there also stated
that it could not presume, under the terms of the Kentucky statute,
that the acts of the defendant were destructive in purpose. 5
,"

1La Rue, Pitfalls for Price Competitors, 15 W. Res. L. Rev. 35, 38 (1963).
21d. at 46 n. 56.
3 883 S.W.2d at 366.
4279 Ky. 585, 131 S.W.2d 499 (1939).

5Id, at 592, 131 S.W.2d at 503.
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However, the court in the principal case stated, as a matter of law,
that the statute appeared violated when free service was given to a
competitor's customer for the purpose of obtaining that customer's
patronage." When a seller seeks the business of a customer of a
competitor, the intent to bring about a loss to a competitor is, "inextricable from the intent to effect a gain in business.

. . ."7

Thus the

entire basis for satisfaction of the requisite intent is shifted, in effect,
to a presumption. The basis for such presumption is taken from a
Colorado case, where that court said: "It may be presumed in a civil
action that the natural and probable consequences of the act were
intended by the actor." s
Several weak points in the court's reasoning should be obvious.
First, the court's sole comment concerning the policy question is,
"considering the nature and policy of the statute.

. . ."9

The court

establishes no guidelines as to exactly what it considers the underlying
policy of the statute to be. Secondly, the policy underlying the statute
was explicitly stated at the time of its passage in 1936 in a section
of the act which has since been repealed.' 0
The intention of the act was to:
[Slafeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies
and to foster and encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and
discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is
destroyed or prevented. This Act shall be literally construed that its
beneficial purposes shall be subserved. 1"

The court points to no subsequent statement of legislative purpose
controverting this original declaration of policy. Obviously the benefit
of the statute was to accrue to the public and to competition as a
whole. It was a measure to promote orderly competition and economic stability. A requirement that violations be systematic, or at least
frequent, is implicit in the policy concept of preventing unfairness
detrimental to honest competition. The intent must be shown by
more than the simple acquisition of customers at the expense of a
competitor. The legislature has done more than merely declare it
unfair competition to sell below cost or give away products or
services. An intention to injure competitors and destroy competition
must also be established.
The decision here, stating that a violation of KRS 365.030(1)
6 383 S.W.2d at 366.
7

8

Ibid.

Dikeou v. Food Distrib's Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529, 534 (1940).
9 383 S.W.2d at 366.
1o Ky. Acts 1940, ch. 191. Repealed along with a large number of other
statutes to "simplify and clarify the Statute Laws of Kentucky."
11 Ky. Acts 1940, ch. 191.
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occurred as a matter of law, represents an extreme position. It would
seem to go even further than those states which provide by statute
for a presumption of intent from the mere act of selling below cost,
since the defendant might be deprived of an opportunity to negative
a violation established as a matter of law and not merely presumed.
Nevertheless, demanding that a plaintiff prove a design to undermine the competitive system with each and every sale below cost
might place an unrealistic burden on the plaintiff, rendering the
statute ultimately ineffective. A sale below cost may or may not be
made to injure competition. This is recognized by the exceptions
specifically provided in KRS 365.040. Placing a burden of explanation
upon the defendant who has sold merchandise or services below his
own cost should not work any undue hardship if his conduct was
directed to legitimate commercial ends. The motivations behind such
a departure from ordinarily sound business practices are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the actor and often difficult to prove. In
most cases, the jury should determine whether the defendant's
explanation is satisfactory.
The trial court should not have granted summary judgment against
the plaintiff. On the other hand, stating that as a matter of law the
statute seemed violated, and thus appearing to find conclusively the
requisite intent from the mere act of making a free trial offer of a
service, is likewise unjustified. The court may need to clarify its
position by limiting the holding strictly to this fact situation, or by
relegating much of what was said to the realm of dicta.
Eugene Mullins

FrsT CLAss MUNICn'IITY-ADEQUATE PomCE PowER TO ENACr A
PENAL CrviL RiGxiTs ORDiNANcE.-Whitson, doing business as the

Comer Restaurant, was brought before the police court on warrants
which charged him with violating the Louisville Penal Public Accommodations Ordinance by his refusal to serve food to Negroes in
his restaurant. The lower court dismissed the charges on the ground
that the ordinance was unconstitutional; the Jefferson Circuit Court
held that the city of Louisville did not have sufficient police power to
enact such an ordinance. One of appellees defenses was that the
general statutory powers of first class cities set out in Ky. Rev. Stat.
83.010-.012 [hereinafter referred to as KRSI do not authorize a compulsory integration ordinance because such ordinance is neither specifically authorized by the legislature nor indispensable to the operation

